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The European Union Strategy towards the South European states: the Case of 
Political Transformation in Serbia 
 
        Serbia, as a part of SFRY, at the end of 80th of the XX century was a leader of 
integration processes; but in a result of its collapse and civil wars, also out of the long-
lasting process of confrontation with the Milosevic’s regime, these advantages were 
lost and the process of        institutional reforms was retarded.  
             The failure of the EU peaceful initiatives during the Yugoslavian conflict 
settlement in 90th leaded to the development and implementation fundamentally new 
strategy of stabilization – SAP – economic and political stabilization of the whole 
region in time.  
            The democratic opposition in Serbia took the course on integration into the EU 
from the very beginning (2000) but during long time it wasn’t able to implement the 
radical reforms.  
             In such conditions the EU’ tactics of categorical demands to admit new status 
of Kosovo and cooperate with Hague in aggregate with economic and financial 
support of institutional reforms and speeding up the process of the SAP signing, 
afforded. Such cynical “stick and carrot policy” from the side of EU fortunately was 
crowned with success. 
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The region of central and southern Europe has always played a special role in the 
course of global development. In many ways geopolitical problem of Serbia's position 
in European transformational processes has a long and extremely ambiguous history; 
just remember the word of St Sava's "The East thought that we were West, while the 
West considered us to be East". Serbia, always remaining a European state, both 
territorially and geographically, but has never actually been in Europe Union. 
               As in the past, today the issue of European integration is connected with the 
complexity and uncertainty of "Serbian question" which has a 200 year history: how to 
combine the process of modernization and unification of "Serbism". In 2008, after the 
self-declaration of independence of        Kosovo this dilemma transformed into the 
equally urgent problem - the problem of preservation of state integrity and national 
identity of the Serbs. A long period of crisis and dissolution of SFRY, complicated by a 
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civil war, turned Serbia from a leader of European integration of the end of the 80s 
into an outsider. An extended period of time of democratic revolution to a larger 
extent retarded institutional reforms as well as the essential transformation of social 
structure and political system of the country. 
  
Transformation of internal politics in Serbia in 1990-2000. 
 
At the end of the 1980s under the conditions of acute political crisis in Yugoslavia, the 
process of establishing of multi-party system began: new parties were organized in 
Slovenia and then in the other republics. However only in Serbia, (as opposed to any 
other former Yugoslav republics and the majority of Eastern European countries), 
communists managed to preserve their exclusive domain in power in the multi party 
system for quite a long period of time - right until the beginning of the 21st century. 
This very specificity gives us an opportunity to regard the political processes in Serbia 
as phenomenon of extended in time known as the "velvet revolution". 
 For a decade from the introduction of multi party system and to the "small October 
revolution" there was Slobodan Milosevic's personal rule regime with elements of a 
parliamentary system. Whereas in the countries of central and Eastern Europe the 
democratic opposition managed to come to power using national doctrines, S. 
Milosevic in Serbia under the slogan of "anti-bureaucratic revolution" managed to do 
so that the "old regime" played a role of a new one and created a paradoxical 
situation from a political point of view: the party, ruling for 40 years, managed to 
become a power and an opposition at one time by means of new, as it was called 
"refined" leadership. New Serbian administration leadership deprived the opposition 
of its ideological identity by proclaiming the protection of "serbism" its first objective. 
The most important event in the political live of Serbia of that period was the 
formation of the united opposition party - Democratic Party in 1990. DP leaders 
represented various political trends: from convinced liberals and supporters of 
western model of modernization of Yugoslavia(D. Micunovic and Z. Djindjic) and 
democrats -traditionalists (V. Kostunica, K. Cavoski, N. Milosevic) to radical 
nationalists(V. Sesel). This very heterogeneity determined contradictions in 
administration and constant organizational changes. Centrist and ideologically 
heterogeneous DP turned to be subjected to rifts; problems of national policy and 
uniting into broader coalitions turned out to be the reason why both leftists and 
rightists separated from it. As a result three trends were formed in the Serbian 
political arena: socialist (the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Yugoslav Left - IYUL (July)), 
liberal-democratic (the Democratic Party of Serbia, Serbian Renewal movement) and 
nationalistic (the Serbian Radical Party). 
At the same time the conflict between two leading democratic parties DP and 
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DPS was escalating: more and more they disagreed on the strategy of political 
transformation of the society and the national question. Not least important was the 
personal rivalry for leadership in a democratic camp between two leaders - 
V.Kostunica and Z. Djindjic. 
During the war all the parties except DP and DSP took up extremely 
nationalistic positions, blaming Milosevic for treason and insisting on "unification of all 
Serbian lands". However the same national and patriotic program was proposed by 
the leading SPS. In that way Serbian pluralism was a dilemma of communist and 
anticommunist nationalism. 
The 78-day war of NATO against Yugoslavia turned out to be the determinant 
- the turning point in confrontation of S. Milosevic's regime with democratic 
opposition. The attempt of the regime to represent itself as a "winner" in the war 
made it unpopular with all levels of Serbian society. At the same time the opposition 
forces united and a new coalition called "The Democratic opposition of Serbia" was 
created. The cause for consolidation of all oppositional forces and their unification 
with mass non-partisan protest was the preparation for 2000 elections. 
In reality Z. Djindjic was a creator and a manager of the election campaign DOS 
which resulted in S.Milosevic’s overthrow. The mass youth nongovernmental 
organization “Repulse” became an important ally of the coalition in the election 
campaign. Not less important reason of the triumph of opposition were blunders of 
the ruling regime. The Parliament of Yugoslavia made a number of amendments to 
the Constitution of the FR of Yugoslavia on the 6th July, 2000. Outwardly democratic 
changes, per se, purposed other objects. By means of these changes the Parliament 
actually cleared S. Milosevic the way to (absolute) power. 
It was Z. Djindjic who saw a chance for Serbian opposition in this decision made by 
his opponent. At the same time he managed to preserve the unity of opposition. It 
turned to be possible by Z. Djindjic’s tactical ploy. He understood that his own 
candidature was unacceptable and proposed an uncompromising figure of the DPS 
leader V.Kostunica as a candidate for the FR of Yugoslavia Presidency. All this 
predetermined the success of DOS in Presidential and Parliamentary elections of the 
24th September 2000 and gave an opportunity to head the mass protest movement on 
the 5th October, 2000, which, as a result of the so-called “October revolution”, led to 
the overthrow of S.Milosevic regime. However, becoming the leading coalition in the 
country, the Democratic opposition of Serbia was a priori doomed to the renewal of 
ideological and personal disagreements which characterized the inter-party relations 
in the late 1990’s. Moreover, they only intensified at the beginning of the 21st century, 
when integration into the global society became a necessity. 
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Political in-fighting in Serbia and its relationship with the EU in 2000- 2006 гг. 
 
Straight after V. Kostunica was pronounced the winner in presidential elections, the 
EU rescinded most of the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia and decided to extend the 
measures for liberalization of trade for Serbia. The EU also set a course for Serbia’s 
progressive integration into its organization. For the first time in the last 10 years 
representatives of Belgrade took part in a summit of the heads of state and 
government of the region held in October 2000, in Skopje (Macedonia) and this 
became a legitimization of new “democratic” Yugoslavia. During the conference the 
FR of Yugoslavia officially acceded to the Stability Pact for the countries of South 
Eastern Europe. 
Within the terms of regional cooperation between Serbia and Montenegro in 
April 2003, Serbia and Montenegro joined the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, in 
august – the international Danube Commission and the Regional Transportation and 
Energy System. Direct working contacts between the EU working bodies and the FR of 
Yugoslavia were made in June 2001. During the period between July 2002 and January 
2005 about 10 meetings between the representatives of the European Commission 
and the administration of the FR of Yugoslavia (from February 2003 – Serbia and 
Montenegro) were held, in the course of which the fields subjected to reformation 
were marked. 
              The Thessaloniki Summit was a powerful impetus to the development of the 
regional cooperation. Despite the acute situation in domestic policy in Serbia and 
contradictions between different groups of democrats, the course to euro integration 
became the long-term guiding line in the policy of Z. Zhivkovic’c transitional 
government (2003) as well as of V. Kostunica’s coalition government (2004-2007).   
               According to the decisions made at the Thessaloniki Summit, the government 
of the Republic of Serbia adopted a Plan of actions for bringing the national legal 
system in balance with the acts of the EU in July 2003. “The Office of the Government 
of Serbia for the joining the EU”, formed on the 8th March, 2004 became the main 
administrative body for coordination of work in the course of joining the EU. 
               The major achievement in the work of Serbian government and the 
parliament of Serbia for the joining was the development and adoption of the 
National strategy of Serbia for joining the EU by Serbia and Montenegro in May 2005. 
In spring 2005 the EU took a favorable view of institutional reforms in Serbia and 
Montenegro and was ready to start direct negotiations for signing the Stabilization 
and Association Agreement in autumn 2005. In the statement on the Stabilization and 
Association Agreement among other things it was marked that cooperation between 
Serbia and Montenegro and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia developed rapidly. 
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However, already in spring 2006 the situation in the relationship between 
Serbia and the EU changed drastically: in the agenda not so much the problems of 
institutional transformation came to the fore as the most important issues concerning 
home political stability: the problem of cooperation with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the question of the status of the autonomous 
province of Kosovo and Metohija. It was in many respects connected with the 
situation in home policy of Serbia. 
              On the back of the fierce opposition of DP and DPS the active process of 
growth of the Serbian Radical Party took place. It can be explained by the fact that the 
Serbian Radical Party, gradually but quicker and smoother than the Socialist Party of 
Serbia, transformed from the extremist-radical party to the populist-conservative one 
and became the party of discontent and protest vote. To some extent the leaders of 
the Democratic Party are responsible for that as they thought there was an electoral 
community of the democratic bloc and the most important task is to redistribute 
these votes for its own benefit. As a result there was Kostunica’s weakening as well as 
the extension of influence of the radicals. 
                The results of the elections in Serbia in December 2003 and then the 
formation of Kostunica’s government in March 2004, supported by socialists, caused 
quite negative reaction of the West and laid foundation to the constant search for the 
variants of direct influence upon the political landscape in Serbia. From this moment 
on, V. Kostunica’s coalition governments (2004-May 2008) became opponents to 
Brussels and a factor which hindered the process of integration of Serbia.  
               Strengthening of interparty resistance in spring 2006 led to a stalemate: 
Kostunica’s Cabinet actually blocked the process of judicial reform and reform of force 
structures. In response DP leaders paralyzed the work of Parliament. It instigated the 
outside forces to take decisive actions: leaders of the EU placed their stake on the 
open pressure on Serbia. The Solicitor General of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia K.Del Ponte instigated an accusation of Serbia of the 
rejection to cooperate with ICTY in General Radko Mladic’s search and extradition. At 
the beginning of May 2006 it caused the formal interruption in negotiations for signing 
the Stabilization and Association Agreement. Announcement about the interruption in 
negotiations between the EU and Serbia on the 3rd May 2006 let M.Djukanovic (the 
president of Montenegro) get nominal majority in 0,3 % in favour of separation. 
Having finished the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia on its republican 
boarders, the EU made it clear that it will go any length to the partition of Serbia. 
Separation of Montenegro and formal extinction of the FR of Yugoslavia brought 
legitimacy of Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo into a question as the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244 provided that Kosovo was a sovereign part of a 
federal state. 
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                It is obvious that one of the motives of the actions of the EU aimed at 
breakdown of talks with Serbia was striving for changing the home political landscape 
in the country. Brussels was persuaded to activate the pressure on the political elite of 
the country and to use the method of “carrot and sticks” for the reformation of the 
political arena of Serbia. It happened because of the single-line perception of political 
processes in Serbia by org-men of the EU and their confidence that center-right 
coalition headed by V. Kostunica turns the Euro integration process into the 
alternative of preserving the territorial integrity and national identity of the country 
by its policy.  
 
Means and methods of the EU influence on political landscape in Serbia in  
2006-2008. 
 
Breakdown of negotiations for the signing of the Stabilization and Association 
Agreement at the beginning of May 2006 and the transition of the western partners to 
forced politics about R. Karadijc’s extradition to the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia and about the status of Kosovo caused another political crisis in 
Serbia which lasted up to the spring of 2008. 
During the run in the office the cabinets of the DP (2001-2003) and then during the 
run of power of V. Kostunica’s coalition cabinet in 2004-beginning of 2006 the 
countries of the ES retarded the activity of the ICTY. They were afraid of 
destabilization of internal affairs in Serbia and the ultimate rupture of liberal-
conservative coalition, which, in their opinion, opened the way to power for V. 
Kostunica’s populist bloc and V. Sesel’s radical bloc. However in spring 2006 when the 
rupture of unsteady coalition of V. Kostunica and Tadic’s supporters turned out to be a 
reality and the process of reformation of judicial system and system of force 
structures stopped, the question of R. Mladic and R. Karadjic’s extradition became the 
most effective and sophisticated means of pressure on Belgrade. The radical turn to 
cooperation with the ICTY, especially R. Karadjic’s extradition to the Hague, happened 
only after the victory of democrats in the parliament elections and b. Tadic took 
control over the force structures and first of all over the key one – the Agency of 
Information and Security. 
              After the victory of “the october revolution” new democratic forces of 
Belgrade made every possible effort to implement the Kumanov Agreement and the 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 could improve the 
constructive dialog with the representatives of the international forces in Kosovo and 
the Contact group and to launch the complicated process of quest for a compromise 
on the basis of the formula “at first-standards – then status”. By common effort they 
managed to localize the spread of the conflict in the southern parts of Serbia in March 
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2001, which by the Kumanov Agreement were turned to so-called “buffer zone” of 
Preshev valley. 
However the deadlock in the process of Kosovo regulation contributed to the fact that 
by the end of 2002 Belgrade came to a conclusion that the battle for standards and 
creation of multiethnic Kosovo had failed and now it was essential to force onto the 
final defining of Kosovo’s status in a direct dialog with Washington, Moscow and 
Brussels on the basis of its partition. The document called “the Strategy for Kosovo 
and Metohija” adopted by Serbian government at the end of December, 2002 
presupposed constitutionalization of Serbian community in the administrative system 
of Kosovo and Metohija in the so-called “Dayton variant” by formula “more that 
autonomy, less than republic”. 
              New correlation of forces in Belgrade formed after Z. Djindjic’s assassination 
on the 12th of March 2003, immediately influenced the process of negotiations on the 
status of Kosovo. Internal fight for power in Serbia between the supporters of 
different Serbian parties in Serbian enclaves led to the full loss of initiative in the 
process of negotiations by Belgrade, which allowed the international community, first 
of all, the USA, the EU and the UN took the initiative in the final work on the status of 
Kosovo.Total failure of the policy “at first-standards – then status” afforded General 
Secretary of the UN  K. Annan ground to make a decision about the beginning of direct 
negotiations about the future status of Kosovo. The further course of negotiations 
about the status of Kosovo under the aegis of M. Ahtisaari, which began in February 
2006, became a preparation to the proclamation of independence of Kosovo, which 
was reflected in Ahtisaari plan, manifested in January 2007. Breakdown of 
negotiations about SPS, and the deadlock of negotiations about the status of Kosovo 
in autumn 2006 ignited another political crisis in Serbia.  
            Despite the fact that the new Constitution of Serbia was adopted in October 
2006 which proclaimed the province of Kosovo and Metohija a constituent part of 
Serbian territory, the strain in relationship of Tadic’s and Kostunica’s supporters was 
at its height. Special [parliamentary elections held on the 20th January 2007 could not 
help to overcome the crisis: the process of formation of the government lasted 4 
months and was finished on the 15th of May 2007 with formation of V.Kostunica’s 
coalition cabinet with the Democratic Party, conservative-traditionalist bloc of the         
Democratic Party of Serbia, V. Ilic’s «New serbia» and the party called «Group 17 
plus». 
             Though the principle of work of coalition government was based on five 
agreements established during the negotiations – retaining of Kosovo as a part of 
Serbia, Euro integration, fighting against corruption and organized crime, 
intensification of social and economic policy and cooperation of Serbia with the ICTY – 
the crisis was not overcome: the final political landscape was formed as a result of the 
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parliament elections in January- the beginning of February 2008 as well as the result 
of snap parliament elections of the 11th of May, 2008 which took place against the 
backdrop of acute political crisis, caused by ther declaration of Kosovo independence 
on the 17th February 2008. 
            In many respects the unexpected victory of the coalition “For European Serbia” 
in the parliament elections of the 11th May, 2008 and the following formation of 
coalition government of democrats with socialists and their electoral bloc partners 
was a result of principal changes of Serbian public sentiments towards the pro-
European vote and of the competent tactics used by the Democratic Party. B.Tadic 
managed not only to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU on 
the 28th April 2008, but also 2 days before the elections he managed to reach the 
approval of  the Oil and Gas Agreement with Russia, signed by the government on the 
25th January 2008. By doing this he managed to decrease the original clash of Serbian 
national consciousness – either with the West, or with Russia, by opposing this 
traditional choice to the formula – both with the West and with Russia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
